BEFORE THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Order Instituting Rulemaking to Examine Electric Utility De-Energization of Power Lines in Dangerous Conditions	Rulemaking 18-12-005 (File December 13, 2018).

BEAR VALLEY ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC. (U 913 E)

PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF POST-EVENT REPORT FOR

OCTOBER 10, 2026 DE-ENERGIZATION EVENT

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October 23, 2026

BEFORE THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Order Instituting Rulemaking to Examine Electric Utility De-Energization of Power Lines in Dangerous Conditions	Rulemaking 18-12-005 (File December 13, 2018).

BEAR VALLEY ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC. (U 913 E) PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF POST-EVENT REPORT FOR OCTOBER 10, 2026 DE-ENERGIZATION EVENT

Bear Valley Electric Service, Inc ("BVES") hereby submits its **Public Safety Power Shutoff Post-Event Report ("Report") for October 10, 2026 de-energization event** hereto as Attachment A. This report is submitted as requested by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) – Wildfire Safety and Enforcement Branch (WSEB) email of June 29, 2026 to BVES, in the format established by California Public Utilities Commission Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Order Instituting Rulemaking Phase 1 Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Phase 2 D.20-05-051, Phase 3 D.21-06-034 and PSPS Order Instituting Investigation D.21-06-014.

This report is being distributed to the service lists for the following Commission rulemaking proceedings: R. 18-10-007 and R. 18-12-005, as well as all affected local and county public safety partners.

Pursuant to the October 14, 2021 email ruling of Administrative Law Judge Valerie Kao, BVES hereby provides the following link to access and download the attachments and appendices to its Report: https://www.bvesinc.com/safety/public-safety-power-shutoff.

Respectfully submitted,

BY: /s/ Jenny Chen

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October 23, 2026

Attachment A

Bear Valley Electric Service, Inc.

PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF POST-EVENT

REPORT FOR OCTOBER 10, 2026

DE-ENERGIZATION EVENT

Template for Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS)
Post-Event and Lessons Learned Report

The California Public Utilities Commission's (CPUC) Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) prepared this template to be used by electric investor-owned utilities for the PSPS post-event and lessons learned report required in Decision (D.) 19-05-042. The source of each reporting requirement is referred to following each section and cited in paratheses. CPUC Decisions cited in this template include Resolution ESRB-8, Decision (D.) 19-05-042, D.20-05-051, D.21-06-014, and D.21-06-034. Additional reporting is also included by SED, pursuant to the authority granted to SED by the CPUC in D.19-05-042 at 108 and Appendix A at A25. Each IOU's post-event report must be sent to the service list for CPUC Rulemaking R18-12-005 and R18-10-007 or their successor proceedings.

BEAR VALLEY ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC.
Utility Report
Table of Contents

Section 1. Executive Summary 1
Section 2. Decision-Making Process 3
Section 3. De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers 3
Section 4. Damage and Hazards to Overhead Facilities 4
Section 5. Notifications 5
Section 6. Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement 10
Section 7. Complaints & Claims 11
Section 8. Power Restoration 11
Section 9. Community Resource Centers 12
Section 10. Mitigations to Reduce Impact 12
Section 11. Lessons Learned from this Event 13
Section 12. Other Relevant Information 13
Officer Verification 13
Appendix 13

Section 1. Executive Summary

This section provides an overview of the Public Safety Power Shutoff

(PSPS) event. It must include, at a minimum:

1. Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers have been restored. (D.21-06-014, page 286, SED Additional Information.)

   RESPONSE: Bear Valley Electric Service, Inc. (BVES) submits this post-event report regarding Southern California Edison's (SCE) initiation of a Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) on October 10, 2026, which affected BVES' system. BVES was not involved in any way with SCE's decision to de-energize SCE's power supply lines to the BVES system as part of SCE's October 10, 2026, PSPS event. Set forth below is BVES' summarized timeline for this SCE PSPS event based upon BVES' understanding of relevant facts.

   October 7, 2026 Timeline:

   BVES was notified by SCE that SCE had placed SCE's 33kV Cushenberry and SCE's 33kV Ute Lines in scope for a potential Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) on Saturday 10/10/2026 from 12:01AM to 9:00PM. These lines feed BVES' two main 34kV sub-transmission lines (Shay and Baldwin circuits). SCE advised BVES that the potential PSPS was due to high winds and fire conditions forecasted in the region.

   October 8, 2026 Timeline:

   At 8:46 AM, BVES reached out to community safety partners regarding SCE's Potential Public Safety Power Shutoff October 10. Throughout the day, updates to BVES customers were provided through Facebook, text messages and www.bvesinc.com. Information was also shared with local community partners and news media. See Appendix A for all communications shared with customers and community partners.

   At 1:07 PM, BVES received an official email notification from SCE that that the period of concern impacting SCE's 33kV Cushenberry and SCE's 33kV Ute Line feeding BVES's two main 34kV sub-transmission lines (Shay and Baldwin circuits) had changed. The period of concern had changed to 9:00AM to 6:00PM Saturday, Oct. 10. SCE advised BVES that this was due to high winds and fire conditions forecasted in the region.

   October 9, 2026 Timelines:

   At 1:02 PM, BVES received an official email notification from SCE that SCE's 33kV Cushenberry and SCE's 33kV Ute Line remained in scope for

potential Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) on Saturday 10/10/2026 from 9:00AM to 6:00PM. SCE advised BVES that this was due to high winds and fire conditions forecasted in the region.

October 10, 2026 Timelines:

At 1:18 PM, BVES received an official email notification from SCE that SCE's 33kV Cushenberry and SCE's 33kV Ute Line remained in scope for potential Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) on Saturday 10/10/2026 from 9:00AM to 6:00PM. SCE advised BVES that this was due to high winds and fire conditions forecasted in the region.

At 2:54 PM, BVES received an official email notification from SCE that they were preparing for expected shutoff on the SCE 33kV Cushenberry and the SCE 33kV Ute Line that feed BVES's two main 34kV sub-transmission lines (Shay and Baldwin circuits).

At 2:57 PM, SCE invoked a PSPS event by de-energizing the SCE 33kV Cushenberry Line and SCE's 33KV Ute Line that feed the BVES Baldwin and Shay circuits. The BVES team responded to the situation within an hour of de-energization and began work to provide the limited amount of available electricity to affected customers. BVES prioritized critical infrastructure, then commercial customers (gas stations, grocery stores, etc.), and then residential customers. In addition, the BVES team opened its Community Resource Center for impacted customers.

At 3:30 PM, BVES texted customers to let them know that SCE had implemented a PSPS event, and that the Community Resource Center would remain open from 8AM to 10PM during a PSPS outage. Updates were provided through Facebook, text messages, and www.bvesinc.com.

By 4:33 PM, BVES was able to start providing electricity to critical infrastructure, commercial customers (gas stations, grocery stores, etc.), and some residential customers utilizing BVES generation (8.4 MW) and energy received over the BVES 34kV Radford Circuit (5MW), which feeds from the SCE 33kV Bear Valley Line.

At 4:40 PM, BVES received a notification from SCE that their trouble man was heading up to patrol the SCE 33kV Cushenberry Line and the SCE 33kV Ute Line. At that time, their trouble man was an hour away.

At 5:01 PM, BVES received a notification from the SCE trouble man that they were 30 minutes away from finishing patrolling the SCE 33kV Cushenberry Line and the SCE 33kV Ute Line.

At 5:46 PM, BVES received a notification from SCE that the SCE 33kV Cushenberry Line and the SCE 33KV Ute Line were energized.

As of 7:14 PM, all BVES circuits from SCE returned to normal.
At 8:03 PM, BVES received an official email notification from SCE that the SCE 33kV Cushenberry Line and the SCE 33kV Ute Line had been patrolled, re-energized and no longer in scope.

2. A table (see Table 1) including the maximum numbers of customers notified and actually de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de- energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de- energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized. Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed. Table 1 must contain unique data counts from the event. (D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A15, SEDAdditional Information.)

Table 1: PSPS Event Summary


Total Customers			MBL Customers	Number of Counties	Number of Tribes	Number of Circuits			Damage/ Hazard Count	Critical Facilities and Infrastructure
PSPS Notified	De-energized	Cancelled	De-energized	De-energized	De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Distribution Circuits in Scope	Distribution Circuits de-energized		De-energized

RESPONSE:
Table 1: SCE PSPS Event Summary affected BVES

Total Customers			MBL Customers	Number of Counties	Number of Tribes	Number of Circuits			Damage/Hazard Count	Critical Facilities and Infrastructure
PSPS Notified	De-energized	Cancelled	De-energized	De-energized	De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Distribution Circuits in Scope	Distribution Circuits de-energized		De-energized
24769	24769	0	124	1	N/A	N/A	0	25	0	21

3. A PDF map (see example below) depicting the de-energized area(s) (SED Additional Information.)

4. **De-energization Footprint Map**



Section 2. Decision-Making Process

Reports on the decision-making process must include, at a minimum:

1. A table showing all factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including but not limited to, sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de- energized circuits (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)

   RESPONSE: Not applicable. BVES had no involvement or input whatsoever in SCE's decision-making process to declare PSPS events on October 10, 2026.

2. Use the following format to provide decision-making criteria detailing circuit level analysis and comparison between threshold, forecast, and actual readings utilized during the scoping process and de-energization process. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, provide circuit thresholds for each de-energization. Also include a PSPS decision-making diagram(s)/flowchart(s) or equivalent along with narrative description (D.19-05-042, Appendix A,page A22, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)

   Table 2: Decision-Making Process

Circuit	Segment (if applicable)	De-energization date/time	Restoration date/time	Threshold 1	Forecast 1	Actual Readings 1
Circuit 1		1/15/2026 at 1200 hours	1/16/2026 at 1700 hours			
Circuit 1		1/17/2026 at 1200 hours	1/18/2026 at 1700 hours			
Circuit 2						
Circuit…						

   RESPONSE: Not applicable. BVES had no involvement or input whatsoever in SCE's decision-making process to declare PSPS events on October 10, 2026.

3. A thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event including any fire risk or PSPS risk modeling results and information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort, and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the

de-energization event. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 9, SED Additional Information.)

4. An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks, and analysis of the risks of de-energization against not de-energizing for each circuit or circuit segment. The utility mustidentify and quantify customer, resident, and the general public risks and harms from de-energization and clearly explain risk models, risk assessment processes, and provide further documentation on how the power disruptions to customers, residents, and the general public is weighed against the benefits of a proactive de-energization (D.19-05- 042, Appendix A, page A24, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)

   RESPONSE: Not applicable. BVES had no involvement or input whatsoever in SCE's decision-making process to declare PSPS events on October 10, 2026.

5. Explanation of alternatives considered and evaluation of each alternative. (D.19-05-042 Appendix A, page A22.)

   RESPONSE: Not applicable. BVES had no involvement or input whatsoever in SCE's decision-making process to declare PSPS events on October 10, 2026, including consideration and evaluation of alternatives.

Section 3. De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

This section must include, at a minimum:

1. The summary of time, place and duration of the event, broken down by phase if applicable (Resolution ESRB-8 page 3, SED Additional Information.)

   RESPONSE: Please refer to Section 1.1 for summary timeline and duration (broken down by phase) of the SCE-invoked PSPS event on October 10, 2026 that affected BVES's entire system.

2. A consolidated zipped geodatabase (.gdb) file that includes all PSPS event data requested in Section 3.2 and Section 4.3. Use WGS 1984 Web Mercator Auxiliary Sphere projected coordinate system (WKID: Esri 3857) for the geodatabase. The geodatabase must include PSPS polygon feature classes of de-energized areas with items that are required in Section 3.3. In addition, the geodatabase

must contain one consolidated event single polygon feature class with the following exact fields (dates will be formatted XX/XX/XX): (SED Additional Information.)

- Event Name: [same PSPS Event Name used during the event and shared with public safety partners]
- First Date of POC: [first date of initial period of concern]
- IOU: [PGE, SCE, SDGE, Liberty, PacifiCorp, or BVES]
- De-energization Start Date: [XX/XX/XX]
- Full Restoration Date: [XX/XX/XX]
- Customers De-energized: [unique count matching Table 1]
- De-energization: [Yes or No]

RESPONSE: Please see the zipped file labelled, "PSPS_10oct26 .gdb."

3. A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the following information must be provided for each de-energization. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)

    - County
    - De-energization date/time
    - Restoration date/time
    - "All Clear" declaration date/time
    - General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non High Fire Threat District
    - Total customers de-energized
    - Residential customers de-energized
    - Commercial/Industrial customers de-energized
    - Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized
    - AFN other than MBL customers de-energized
    - Other Customers
    - Distribution or transmission classification

RESPONSE: Please see "PSPS_10October26.xlsx" sheet "Table 3-1" and "PSPS_10October26_Table 3-1(PDF).pdf" for Excel and PDF files of Table 3-1. The following table details specified information for each BVES circuit de-energized during this SCE PSPS event and has also been included in the required PSPS Event. Below is the Data Workbook filed with this report.

- County
- De-energization date/time
- Restoration date/time
- "All Clear" declaration date/time
- General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non-High Fire Threat District
- Total customers de-energized
- Residential customers de-energized
- Commercial/Industrial customers de-energized
- Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized
- AFN other than MBL customers de-energized
- Other Customers
- Distribution or transmission classification

Section 4. Damage and Hazards to Overhead Facilities

This section must include, at a minimum:

1. Description of all found wind-related damages or hazards to the utility's overhead facilities in the areas where power was shut off. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)

   RESPONSE: None. BVES' overhead facilities did not experience any damage or hazard during the SCE PSPS invoked event.

2. A table (see Table 3) showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage orhazard, County that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a High Fire-Threat District(HFTD) or non-HFTD, Type of damage/hazard of damage. (SED AdditionalInformation.)

   Table 3: Damages and Hazards

Damages and hazards found within de-energized areas

Circuit Name	County	Structure	Zone 1,Tier 2/3 or Non-HFTD	Type and description of damage/hazard


RESPONSE: None. BVES' overhead facilities did not experience any damage or hazard during the SCE PSPS invoked event.

3. The consolidated zipped geodatabase file from Section 3.2 must include the PSPS event damage and hazard points, if applicable. The file should include fields that are in Table 3. (SED Additional Information.)

   RESPONSE: None. BVES' overhead facilities did not experience any damage or hazard during the SCE PSPS invoked event.

4. A PDF map (see example below) identifying the location of each damage or hazard. (SEDAdditional Information.)

Example Map of Damages and Hazards Found within the PSPS Footprint



RESPONSE: None. BVES' overhead facilities did not experience any damage or hazard during the SCE PSPS invoked event.

Section 5. Notifications

This section must include, at a minimum:

1. A description of the notice to California Independent System Operator (as needed), public safety partners, local/tribal governments, paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center, multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community, and all customers, including the means by which utilities provide notice to customers of the locations/hours/services available for CRCs, and where to access electricity during the hours the CRC is closed. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3 D19-05-042, page A26, D21-06-034, Appendix A, page A2, A9-A10, SEDAdditional Information.)

RESPONSE:

BVES Table 5-1

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
Potential PSPS notice	PSPs and CFIs (first responders, city officials, media, telecoms, utilities, hospitals, transportation providers) All Customers	Initial notice of potential SCE PSPS event affecting all customers.
Imminent De-energization	Traditionally, we would message above partners when shutoff was expected. Given the limited notice we received that a shutoff was expected, we were not able to send an expected shutoff notice.	Notification that shut-off is likely within 1-4 hours.
De-energization	PSPs and CFIs (first responders, city officials, media, telecoms, utilities, hospitals, transportation providers) All Customers	Power has been shut off (de-energization initiated), and the CRC is open.
Re-energization / event concluded	PSPs and CFIs (first responders, city officials, media, telecoms, utilities, hospitals, transportation providers) All Customers	Power has been restored

See Appendix A for notifications to customers.

2. Notification timeline including prior to de-energization or Period of Concern (if no de-energization), initiation, restoration and cancellation, if applicable, for each circuit or circuit segment. The timeline should include the required minimum timeline and approximate time notifications were sent for each de-energization if a circuit was de-energized multiple times. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A8-A9, D.21-06-034, page A11)

RESPONSE:

BVES Table 5-2

Event Order	Notification Type	Requirement Timeline	Notifications sent to	Date Sent	Approximate Time
Pre-deenergization	Initial notification for possible SCE PSPS Event	24-48 hours	Email Public Safety Personnel and Critical Facilities/Infrastructure	Thursday, 10/8/26	8:46 a.m.
			Website post	Thursday, 10/8/26	9 a.m.
			Social Media post	Thursday, 10/8/26	9 a.m.
			Text Alert	Thursday, 10/8/26	4:50 p.m.
In Event	De-energization / Conserve Energy	NA	Website post	Saturday, Oct. 10, 2026	3:30 p.m.
			Social Media post	Saturday, Oct. 10, 2026	3:30 p.m.
			Text Alert	Saturday, Oct. 10, 2026	3:30 p.m.
Power Restored	Power has been restored		Website	Saturday, Oct. 10, 2026	7:30 p.m.
			Facebook	Saturday, Oct. 10, 2026	7:30 p.m.

3. For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was

attempted, use the following template (Table 4) to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs populationdesignation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)

RESPONSE:

Table 4: Positive Notification

Designation	Total number of customers	Number of notification attempts made	Timing of attempts	Who made the notification attempt	Successful positive notification
Medical Baseline (MBL) in scope	1353 via text of 1,504 total AFN customers. Some customers do not have active phone numbers in our text software.	2	Thursday, Oct. 8 (possible PSPS) Saturday, Oct. 10 (power is off, CRC is open)	BVES	Yes by text
Etc.					

"Notification attempts made" and "Successful positive notification" must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers in scope, the utility must explain the reason. In addition, the utility must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications. Utilities may not mark N/A and must answer 5.3 regardless if the utility did not de-energize customers (SED Additional Information.)

4. A copy or scripts of all notifications with a list of all languages that each type of notification was provided in, the timing of notifications, the methods ofnotifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners). (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)

RESPONSE: Copies of all notifications are in Appendix A

BVES performed all primary BVES customer notifications, and encouraged public safety partners to amplify messages on their platforms, as appropriate. BVES offered all notifications in English and encourage customers to check for updates on our website and Facebook pages

5. If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, using the following template (Table 5) to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure. This applies to both de-energization and non de-energization events. For non-de-energization event, the starting time of the first Period of Concern is the anticipated de-energization time to assess notification failure. If a circuit is de-energized multiple times during an event, the utility must include notification failures for the multiple de-energizations. The explanation must be specific. (D.21-06-014 page 286, SED Additional Information.)

Table 5: Breakdown of Notification Failure

Notifications sent to	**Notification Failure Description**	**Number of Entities or Customer Accounts**	**Explanation**
Public Safety Partners excluding Critical Facilities and Infrastructure	Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour advance notification.	None	All partners were notified by email.
	Entities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification.		
	Entities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification.	All	We were not notified by SCE in enough time to update our community partners.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	None	All partners with online and phone access received notification.
	Entities who were not notified at de-energization initiation.		
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	All	We did not provide a communication regarding when lines would be re-energized because our SCE partner did not provide an ETR.
	Entities who were not notified when re-energization is complete.		
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within	NA	NA

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Accounts	Explanation
	two hours of the decision to cancel		
Critical Facilities and Infrastructure	Facilities who did not receive 48–72-hour advance notification.	None	All partners were notified by email.
	Facilities who did not receive 24-48 hour advance notification.		
	Facilities who did not receive 1-4 hour of imminent notifications.	All	We were not notified by SCE in enough time to update our community partners.
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization.	None	All partners with online and phone access received notification.
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation.	All	We did not provide a communication regarding when lines would be re-energized because our SCE partner did not provide an ETR.
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re-energization.	All	We did not receive precise notification as this process was occurring.
	Facilities who were not notified when re-energization is complete.	None	Update was posted on website and Facebook.
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	NA	NA
All other affected customers	Customers who did not receive 24–48-hour advance notifications.	None	All customers were notified by text, social media and website.
	Customers who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notifications.	All	We were not notified by SCE in enough time to update our community partners.
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de-energization.	None	All customers with online and phone access received notification.
	Customers who were not notified at de-energization initiation.	All	We did not provide a communication regarding when lines would be re-energized because our SCE partner did not provide an ETR.

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Accounts	Explanation
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization.	All	We did not receive precise notification as this process was occurring.
	Customers who were not notified when re-energization is complete.	None	Update was posted on website and Facebook.
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	NA	NA

6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. (D.21-06-014, page 286.)

RESPONSE: We continue to ask SCE for more informed communications throughout a PSPS event. As this PSPS was led by SCE, we have incredibly limited information regarding the information we receive.

As of 1:15 p.m. Saturday, Oct. 10, SCE informed us that we remained in scope through 6 p.m., which was consistent with Friday's reporting. A call was set for 4 p.m. to discuss updates.

At 2:54 p.m. (prior to our usual 4 p.m. call), we received an email from SCE to "Prepare for Expected Shutoff."

At 3:02 p.m., power was already shut off to the Valley. At that time, teams began the work of opening the Community Resource Center and texted all customers to let them know we were aware of the outage and that the CRC was open.

At 4:30 p.m., we received a message from SCE noting we should "prepare to restore." When pressed for an estimated restoration time, they noted (5:06 p.m.) "I have confirmed with Operations that there is currently no ERT assigned to the Cushenbury & Ute outage."

At 8:03 p.m., we received a message noting that our lines were no longer in scope and had been re-energized. By that point, we had already restored power and informed customers that power had been restored.

7. Enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications citing the sources of changing data. Describe the situations at-issue, which involve the level of perceived defect in notice, in specific detail. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 4.)

   RESPONSE: Again, receiving limited information from SCE about restoration made keeping customers informed of expected shutoff and restoration difficult.

Section 6. Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement

This section must include, at minimum:

1. Use the following table (Table 6) to List the organization names of public safety partners including, but notlimited to, local governments, tribal representatives, first responders and emergency management , and critical facilities and infrastructure the utility contacted in anticipation to de-energization or Period of Concern, the date and time on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affectedby the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in CPUC General Order 95, Rule 21.2-D. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)

Table 6: Public Safety Partners contacted

Jurisdiction/Organization	Title	HFTD Tier	Date/Time Contacted
XX County Fire Department			
XX County OES			
XX Tribe			
Etc.			

RESPONSE:

Table 6: BVES Public Safety Partners contacted

Jurisdiction/Organization	Title	HFTD Tier	Date/Time Contacted
Big Bear Fire Department	Chief		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
San Bernardino County Sheriff	Captain		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
City of Big Bear Lake	City Manager and team		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
Bear Valley Community Hospital	CEO and PIO		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
Bear Valley Hospice	Admin		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.

Jurisdiction/Organization	Title	HFTD Tier	Date/Time Contacted
Verizon, ATT, Frontier, Motive Energy, Charter, T-Mobile	Customer sales team		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
Big Bear Community Services District	General Manager		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
BBARWA	General Manager		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
BBL Department of Water and Power	PIO		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
Southwest Gas	Numerous		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
Big Bear Airport	General Manager		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
Bear Mountain Resort	Numerous		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
BB Municipal Water District	General Manager		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
Bear Valley Unified School District	Superintendent and team		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
Mountain Transit	Admin		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
SB County	Numerous – public health and safety		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
Big Bear Grizzly	Editor		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
Big Bear Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
KBHR Radio	Owner / Manager		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.
SoCal Mountains Foundation	Admin		Thursday, Oct. 8, 8:46 a.m.

2. List the names of all entities invited to the utility's Emergency Operations Center for a PSPS event, the method used to make this invitation, and whether a different form of communication was preferred by any entity invited to the utility's emergency operation center. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)
   RESPONSE: This was not our PSPS event, so we did not open an EOC.
3. A statement verifying the availability to public safety partners of accurate and timely geospatial information, and real time updates to the GIS shapefiles in preparation for an imminent PSPS event and during a PSPS event. In addition, list any accuracy or timeliness issues in making available the GIS shapefiles to public safety partners during the PSPS event from activation to full restoration. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)

RESPONSE: N/A, as this PSPS event was initiated by SCE, not BVES.

4. A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced outreach and notification during the PSPS event. (D.19-05-042, Appendix, page A23.)

   RESPONSE: As noted, we provided as much advanced notice as we were able to, given that we did not receive 1-4 hour notice that the shutoff would occur.

5. Specific engagement with local communities regarding the notification and support provided to the AFN community. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 8, SED Additional Information.)

   RESPONSE: When power went out Saturday, Oct. 10, we notified all customers, including all AFN and Medical Baseline customers, that the CRC was open.

6. Provide the following information on backup power (including mobile backup power) with the name and email address of a utility contact for customers for each of the following topics: (D.21-06-014, page 300.)

   a. Description of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

   b. The capacity and estimated maximum duration of operation of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

   c. The total number of backup generators provided to critical facility and infrastructure customer's site immediately before and during the PSPS.

   d. How the utility deployed this backup generation to the critical facility and infrastructure customer's site.

   e. An explanation of how the utility prioritized how to distribute available backup generation.

   f. Identify the critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation.

   Response:

a) BVES has six mobile battery power units available for emergency use by the public with priority given to those experiencing medical emergency.

b) Each unit has a 720Wh capacity.

c) None. One visitor to the CRC requested a battery for their child's sleepover party, but that did not meet our qualifications for emergency use for medical purposes.

by BVES.

d) N/A

e) If needed, BVES would have prioritized distributing back-up batteries for us by Medical Baseline customers in duress.

f) None

Section 7. Complaints & Claims


This section must include, at minimum: the number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, D.21-06-014, page 304.)

RESPONSE: We received approximately 156 comments on our Facebook posts. The vast majority were complaints. A few are highlighted below.





We also received many complaints via our two-way text system, many of which included abusive comments. A few are highlighted below.



Section 8. Power Restoration

This section must include, at minimum:

1. A detailed explanation of the steps the utility took to restore power (Resolution ESRB-8 page 5.)

   RESPONSE: During the SCE invoked PSPS event, BVES was able to restore power to a majority of critical infrastructure on BVES circuits utilizing BVES generation and energy over the SCE 33kV Bear Valley Line that fed BVES's 34kV Radford circuit. All BVES circuit restorations were guided by safety

considerations.

2. The timeline for power restoration, broken down by phase if applicable (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, SED Additional Information.)

   RESPONSE: BVES restored power to all impacted BVES customers by 7:14 PM on October 10, 2026. The full timeline broken down by BVES circuit is in Table 3-1.

3. For any circuits that require more than 24 hours to restore, the utility shall use the following template (Table 7) to explain why it was unable to restore each circuit within this timeframe, using the format below. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 6.)

   Table 7: Circuits requiring more than 24 hours to restore

Circuit Name	Reason the Utility was Unable to Restore the Circuit Within 24 Hours
Circuit	Restoration delayed due to xxxx

RESPONSE: None of BVES' circuits experienced more than 24 hours of outage during the SCE-invoked PSPS event. No circuit required more than 24 hours to restore after the SCE-invoked PSPS event was lifted.

Section 9. Community Resource Centers

This section must include, at minimum:

1. Using the following template (Table 8) to report information including the address (including city and zip code) of each location during a de-energization event, the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), the assistance available at each location, the days and hours that it was open, and attendance (i.e., number of visitors) (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)


   Table 8

CRC Open Date(s)	Oct. 10, 2026
County	San Bernardino
Site Name	BVES
Address	42020 Garstin Drive, Big Bear Lake, CA 92315
Operating Hours	3:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. (duration of outage)

Attendance	26 people attended, see appendix.
Site Type	Indoor
Amenities Provided	Coffee Water Wifi access Ice Snacks/Cookies Charging station Information Restrooms Chairs First aid available if needed Blankets Flashlights
Communities / Times / Places / Potential Circuits Supported	Full community as needed

2. Any deviations and explanations from the CRC requirement including operation hours, ADA accessibility, and equipment. (SED Additional Information.)
   RESPONSE: BVES is not aware of any deviations from CRC requirements during SCE-invoked PSPS event.
3. A map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas (SED Additional Information.)

   RESPONSE: We operated one CRC at 42020 Garstin, Big Bear Lake, CA 92315



Section 10. Mitigations to Reduce Impact

This section must include, at minimum:

1. A description of how sectionalization, i.e. separating loads within a circuit, was considered and implemented and the extent to which it impacted the size and scope of the de-energization event (D.19-05-042, page A23)

   RESPONSE: BVES was not able to take any mitigation actions to reduce impacts of the SCE-invoked PSPS event on BVES customers due to configuration of the electrical infrastructure of BVES's system.

2. Mitigation actions and impacts (both waterfall graph and map) including: sectionalization devices, temporary generation, microgrids,permanent backup generation, transmission switching, covered conductor, and any other grid hardening that mitigated the impact of the event (D.21-06-014, page 285, SED Additional Information.)

   RESPONSE: BVES was not able to take any mitigation actions to reduce impacts of the SCE-invoked PSPS event on BVES customers due to configuration of the electrical infrastructure of BVES's system.

Section 11. Lessons Learned from this Event

1. Threshold analysis and the results of the utility's examination of whether its thresholds are adequate and correctly applied in the de-energized areas. The utility must include specific information pertaining to the event. (D.21-06-014, pages 305-306.)

   RESPONSE: Not applicable. BVES thresholds did not apply to the October-10 PSPS event, since it was SCE initiated.

2. Use the below format (Table 9) to report any lessons learned that will lead to future improvement for the utility(SED Additional Information.)

   RESPONSE: See table in #3

3. Table 9: Lessons Learned

   RESPONSE: BVES received one official email update during SCE invoked PSPS affecting BVES service line. BVES relied on the SCE trouble man to provide BVES updates including SCE personnel enroute to patrol SCE 33kV Cushenberry Line and SCE's 33KV Ute Line, estimated time of arrival, estimated time of completion and energizing SCE line. BVES will provide feedback to the SCE team for future improvements.

Lessons Learned from PSPS Event		
Issue	**Discussion**	**Resolution**
Communication from SCE	Better communication update from SCE during SCE invoked PSPS	Provide feedback to the SCE team

Section 12. Other Relevant Information

This section must include any other relevant information determined by theutility.

RESPONSE: BVES does not have any other relevant information to share at this time with respect to SCE's PSPS event.

Officer Verification

I am an officer of the applicant corporation herein and am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I am informed and believe that the matters stated in this foregoing document are true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on this 23rd of October, 2026 in Big Bear Lake, California.

//s// Paul Marconi
President, Treasurer & Secretary
Bear Valley Electric Service, Inc

Notes:

1. All tables and appendix should also beprovided in Excel format as a supplemental document.
2. All Excel spreadsheets must be combined into one file with different tabs to differentiate the topics. The Excel file must have a Table of Contents.
3. The utility must submit one PSPS post-event report for each event unless approval is given by the Director of SED prior to the due date of the report. All requests for extensions of the due dates or to combine reports must be submitted in writing and include the service list for CPUC Rulemaking 18-12-005 or a successor

proceeding.

4. All the submitted documentation including the appendices must be legible.
5. The utility may cross-reference to sections and subsections of the report where a topic has already been addressed.
6. The utility may add additional tables and use its own table numbering to report complete PSPS information.
7. The report and the appendix must be paginated.
8. PSPS Post Event Report file name and report title will include the same PSPS Event Name used during the event and shared with public safety partners (i.e. [IOU] PSPS Event [first date of initial period of concern] Post Event Report).

Appendix A – Customer Notification

Email Warning Potential PSPS:

[redacted]

Sent: Thursday, October 8, 2026 8:46 AM

[redacted]

Subject: SCE: Potential Public Safety Power Shutoff Saturday, 10/10/26

Dear community partners,

Southern California Edison (SCE) has informed us of a potential public safety power shutoff (PSPS) Saturday, Oct. 10, from 12:01 a.m. to 9 p.m. (essentially all of Saturday). This period of concern is due to high winds and fire conditions that may affect their lines serving our area.

There is no outage scheduled at this time. However, if SCE de-energizes these lines, BVES will have very limited capacity, and some or all customers may experience an outage. Customers should prepare for the possibility of an extended outage and continue monitoring BVES updates.

For more information, call (800) 808-2837, visit www.bvesinc.com, or follow BVES on Facebook.

Facebook post (updated throughout PSPS, from warning to restoration):

7:15 PM: Power has now been restored.

3PM Update: BVES is aware of the current outage. BVES Community Resource Center is open from 8AM to 10PM during PSPS outages.

Southern California Edison (SCE) has informed BVES of a potential public safety power shutoff (PSPS) Saturday, Oct. 10, from 12:01 a.m. to 9 p.m. (essentially all of Saturday). This period of concern is due to high winds and fire conditions that may affect their lines serving our area.


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
Text messages:

Text to all customers, including AFN and Medical Baseline, alerting possible


PSPS: Thursday, Oct. 8, 2026



Text to all customers, including AFN and Medical Baseline, noting we are aware of shutoff and CRC is open: Saturday, Oct. 10, 2026



Website:



Outage

October 8, 2026 at 8:53 AM

SCE: Potential PSPS Saturday, Oct. 10, 2026

7:15 PM: Power has now been restored.


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For more information, call (800) 808-2837, visit www.bvesinc.com, or follow BVES on Facebook.

*An alert also appeared at the top of every BVES webpage in red in this area:


If you have recently lost your job, even if you are receiving unemployment benefits, you may qualify for a reduced energy rate through our CARE program
Toll Free: 1-800-808-2837
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Community
Home > About > Latest News > SCE: Potential PSPS Saturday, Oct. 10, 2026
Outage